"Liberalizing" the English National Health Service: background and risks to healthcare entitlement by Filippon J et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Filippon J, Giovanella L, Konder M, Pollock AM. "Liberalizing" the English 
National Health Service: background and risks to healthcare entitlement. 
Cadernos de saude publica 2016, 32(8), e00034716. 
 
 
Copyright: 
Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto sob uma licença Creative Commons. 
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-311X00034716  
Date deposited:   
21/12/2017 
Cad. Saúde Pública, Rio de Janeiro, 32(8):e00034716, ago, 2016
1REVISÃO   REVIEW
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0102-311X00034716
“Liberalizing” the English National Health 
Service: background and risks to  
healthcare entitlement
A “liberalização” do Serviço Nacional de Saúde da 
Inglaterra: trajetória e riscos para o direito à saúde
La “liberalización” del Servicio Nacional de Salud 
de la Inglaterra: trayectoria y riesgos para el 
derecho a la salud Jonathan Filippon 1
Ligia Giovanella 2
Mariana Konder 3
Allyson M. Pollock 1
Abstract
The recent reform of the English National Health Service (NHS) through 
the Health and Social Care Act of 2012 introduced important changes in 
the organization, management, and provision of public health services in 
England. This study aims to analyze the NHS reforms in the historical con-
text of predominance of neoliberal theories since 1980 and to discuss the 
“liberalization” of the NHS. The study identifies and analyzes three phases: 
(i) gradual ideological and theoretical substitution (1979-1990) – transi-
tion from professional and health logic to management and commercial 
logic; (ii) bureaucracy and incipient market (1991-2004) – structuring of 
the bureaucracy focused on administration of the internal market and 
expansion of pro-market measures; and (iii) opening to the market, frag-
mentation, and discontinuity of services (2005-2012) – weakening of the 
territorial health model and consolidation of health as an open market 
for public and private providers. This gradual but constant liberalization 
has closed services and restricted access, jeopardizing the system’s compre-
hensiveness, equity, and universal healthcare entitlement in the NHS.
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The British Parliament’s approval of the Health 
and Social Care Act 1 in 2012 was a milestone in 
the history of international public health in the 
new millennium 2. The National Health Service 
(NHS) is acknowledged as one of the most ef-
ficient and accessible state systems in the West 
and was a pioneer in universal access to health 
services and hierarchical organization of an ev-
idence-based system of healthcare and primary 
care 3. Maintained by public taxes, the NHS and 
its principles date to 1948. At a favorable histori-
cal moment for the concepts of universal, free 
coverage, under Labour Party aegis, the NHS was 
established as part of the Welfare System that 
leveraged the United Kingdom’s socioeconomic 
recovery in a politically polarized post-World War 
II scenario 4.
Despite sharing values and denomination, 
since 1999 each member country of the United 
Kingdom has an independent national health 
system: NHS Scotland, NHS Northern Ireland, 
NHS Wales, and NHS England. The Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 1 only regulates the reform 
of the English health system, responsible for 
the healthcare of 53.5 million people. The Act of 
Parliament scarcely modified services from the 
population’s perspective, since access to health-
care was not altered immediately. While main-
taining public financing via taxes, the system 
underwent an extensive internal reform that 
may affect the universal right to health. Medi-
ated by the new legislation, previously incipient 
processes of healthcare’s organizational frag-
mentation in the administrative, institutional, 
and especially financial areas (vis-à-vis public 
spending) were radically intensified, multiply-
ing the intermediaries between purchasers and 
providers of services. Although the NHS has 
undergone administrative reforms since it was 
founded in 1948, the 2012 proposal deepens 
the system’s liberalization, both in the reform’s 
underlying theoretical basis and its administra-
tive measures: structural changes in the health 
system; demise of social consensus in the Wel-
fare System; defense of the market’s legitimacy 
for meeting social demands via downsizing 
the state’s role 5,6; and stimulus for pro-mar-
ket organizational elements within the public 
administration.
Why could administrative changes in the 
English NHS be significant for a large share of the 
world’s health systems? The NHS is benchmark 
for universal health systems and symbolizes (or 
symbolized) the necessary limit on the market’s 
influence for guaranteeing universal access to 
health as a social right 5. NHS reforms are publi-
cized quickly and influence health policy debates 
and implementation in other countries.
Pioneering public health systems like the 
English NHS are sensitive to the hegemonic so-
cial theories prevailing in each historical con-
juncture and express the historical moment in 
which they occur. The creation of the NHS in the 
late 1940s allowed the consolidation of universal 
human rights in the United Kingdom 7 in a politi-
cal period of social and economic reconstruction 
of post-War Europe. In the last 30 years, the NHS 
was modified beginning with the economic crises 
of the 1970s, under the influence of the conser-
vative Margaret Thatcher government 8, shifting 
to Labour in the late 1990s and returning to the 
Conservatives 2010. The current scenario reflects 
the force of market relations that extend beyond 
commercial relations to influence the public ser-
vices sector that guarantees social rights 3. The 
current article intends to illustrate the theoretical 
links between the successive reforms in the Eng-
lish NHS, beginning with the so-called Thatcher 
Era (1979) and combining analysis of the reforms 
with a broader conceptual discussion. Despite its 
relevance, the theme has received scanty atten-
tion in the Brazilian literature 9,10,11, concentrat-
ed on specific aspects or on analysis of reforms 
prior to 2012. The current article thus aims to 
help fill this gap.
This article aims to analyze NHS reforms in 
England, discussing the system’s growing “liber-
alization” in this historical context of predomi-
nance of neoliberal theories since the 1980s 8. 
Analysis of the reforms starts with the division 
proposed by Pollock 12, who defines this process 
as privatization/breaking up of the NHS, divided 
into four periods up to 2003: (i) 1980-1990 stran-
gulation and the end of comprehensiveness; (ii) 
1990-1997 the “internal market”; (iii) 1997-2000 
continuous fragmentation under New Labour; 
and (iv) 2000-2003 pointing New Labour to a 
“mixed healthcare economy” 12,13.
This article adapts the division proposed by 
Pollock. It expands the analysis by adding other 
authors and the historical narrative, and extends 
the study to 2012. The periods of liberalization, 
which were more components and moments in 
a process rather than chronological phases, are 
analyzed and named according to their charac-
teristics: (i) gradual ideological and theoretical 
substitution (1979-1990) – transition from pro-
fessional and health logic to a management/
commercial logic; (ii) bureaucracy and incipient 
market (1991-2004) – structuring of the bureau-
cracy focused on administration of the internal 
market and expansion of pro-market measures; 
(iii) opening to the market, fragmentation, and 
discontinuity of services (2005-2012) – weaken-
ing of the territorial health model and consolida-
tion of health as an open market for public and 
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private providers. The “bureaucracy and incipi-
ent market” phase is organized in three chrono-
logical sub-periods that add the last three stages 
from Pollock’s analysis 12.
The analysis includes characteristics of the 
NHS before and after the 2012 reform, as well as 
its historical development (Figure 1). To situate 
the liberalization process, the article’s first sec-
tion summarizes some historical antecedents 
and characteristics of the English health system.
Antecedents: from social health 
insurance to the single, integrated NHS
Social stratification and disordered urbanization 
produced by England’s two Industrial Reforms 
provided fertile ground for the country’s pioneer-
ing trade unions; these in turn increased the so-
cial pressure for better working conditions and 
health services in the early 20th century. Imple-
mentation of the National Health Insurance in 
1911 insured workers that made up to a given 
wage cap and guaranteed primary medical care, 
without hospital coverage, which was generally 
provided by charitable hospitals. General prac-
titioners (GPs) worked as self-employed physi-
cians, and specialists in many cases worked for 
very low pay in hospitals. Some one-third of the 
population was covered, with financing through 
social contributions by workers, employers, and 
government 14.
The Beveridge Report of 1942, commissioned 
by the Conservative-Labour coalition govern-
ment during World War II, laid the theoretical 
foundations for the NHS and spearheaded the 
proposal of redistributive social policies, the 
main objective of the Welfare State. The NHS be-
gan its activities as a universal health system in 
1948. Since its implementation the system has 
undergone reforms in response to the economic, 
social, and political changes over the decades, in-
tensified since the economic crises of the 1970s, 
plus increasing healthcare costs and complexity. 
The Departments of Health and Social Security 
were unified in 1968 as the UK Department of 
Health and Social Security. The system’s local or-
ganization was altered in 1974 by the National 
Health Service Reorganization Act in an attempt 
to promote greater integration among services, 
creating the local health authorities. The pur-
pose of these reforms was to decrease healthcare 
fragmentation, modify the scenario of financial 
favor for teaching hospitals, and extend priority 
to services other than hospitals for acute cases. 
Reform promoted the transition from a system 
of financing by institutions to integrated services 
planning through Area Health Authorities (AHA), 
territorial organization, and use of a needs-based 
resource allocation formula 15. A methodology 
was established to measure local health needs 
(Resource Allocation Working Party – RAWP), 
replacing the financial transfers that followed 
historical averages. These changes innovated by 
improving the system’s efficiency and equity and 
eventually influenced other countries’ health 
policies in subsequent decades 16.
The predominance of market theories in the 
social area began to gain shape and political in-
fluence in England when Thatcher won the 1979 
general elections. Previously, Labour govern-
ments had sought to limit the market’s influence 
in some social areas like health. Favored by the 
global economic crisis, the Conservatives’ scale-
up to power marked the beginning of what we 
refer to as liberalization of the English NHS.
When the Conservatives returned to govern-
ment in the late 1970s, the NHS was a politically 
and administratively centralized system (Table 
1). Structurally speaking, hospitals were state 
property, managed and financed by the state. 
NHS workers were salaried, with the exception of 
GPs and dentists, who worked as self-employed 
professionals 17 on a fulltime basis with the NHS. 
Funds came from the Exchequer and were ad-
ministered by the Department of Health. The 
fourteen Regional Health Authorities were re-
sponsible for managing health services in a given 
territory, executing a population-based budget to 
provide community and hospital services. Stra-
tegic planning and management of community 
and hospital services were subdivided into 90 
AHA and 205 district management teams. Provi-
sion of primary care was monitored by Family 
Physician Committees, financed directly by the 
Department of Health 17.
Gradual ideological and theoretical 
substitution (1979-1990)
The Griffiths Report of 1983, commissioned by 
Thatcher, made harsh criticisms of the NHS in-
stitutional management, launching a period of 
recommendations and structural changes in the 
manner of corporate flowcharts 11,12. Rather than 
the horizontal administrative relations previ-
ously characterizing the NHS, the report estab-
lished hierarchical boards, similar to corporate 
shareholders’ boards, and emphasized and val-
ued the local service manager. As part of the new 
NHS management culture throughout the 1980s, 
the system administrator’s role gained increas-
ing importance. Administrative control began to 
shift away from health professionals, forcing the 
replacement of an organizational culture thith-
erto marked by health professionals’ influence 
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Figure 1
Schematic history of the National Health Service (NHS) and its subsequent phases of liberalization.
CCG: Clinical Commissionning Groups; CQC: Care and Quality Commission; GP: General Practitioners; NICE: National  
Institute for Health and Care Excellence; PCT: Primary Care Trusts.
and leadership and the systematic use of epide-
miological evidence with a typically managerial 
modus operandi, common to the corporate en-
vironment 18.
During this period, in step with transforma-
tion of the prevailing organizational culture, 
there was a first wave of health service outsourc-
ing. Hospitals’ clinical activities were spared, 
but a large share of support activities was out-
sourced, including: cleaning, laundry, nutri-
tion, and general maintenance. There was also 
a strategy to reduce coverage, charging fees for 
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Table 1
Characteristics of English National Health Service (NHS) England before and after liberalization. 
Characteristics NHS pre-liberalization NHS post-liberalization
Financing Public (taxes) Public (taxes); Private (PFI investments)
Financial allocation Defined by: Geographic area; Population 
characteristics; Health needs
Defined by: Clinical Commissioning Groups 
decisions based on specific clinical demands of 
registered clients; List of registered clients per GP; 
Commissioning
Services provision Cooperative combined provision between different 
areas of healthcare; State ownership; Salaried 
payment in specialized and hospital sector; GP: 
capitation payment per population covered; Financing 
in bloc; High complexity services exclusively public
Competition between services based mainly on cost-
effectiveness models; Independence between services 
previously combined in collaborative/complementary 
fashion;  Overlapping supply; GP local budget 
proportional to productivity indicators based on 
diagnosis-related groups; Stimulus for health market 
independent from NHS through incentives for private 
participation for services with waiting lists – private 
commissioning with public financing (mainly for 
elective procedures)
System management Health Planning Authorities: Primary, secondary, and 
tertiary services defined hierarchically by geographic 
area; Legal responsibility of the Secretary of Health
Regulatory agencies (NICE, CQC, HSCIC, Monitor); 
Shared/obscure legal responsibility (elimination of 
Secretary of Health’s duty of care); Individualized 
management focused on GP clients list
Emphasis on administrative control Social control: Department of Health;  Health 
professionals; Users
Corporate control: Shareholders; Management 
boards; Department of Health decentralized in 
independent agencies
CQC: Care and Quality Commission; GP: General Practitioners; HSCIC: Health and Social Care Information Centre; NICE: National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence; PFI: Private Finance Initiatives. 
Source: Prepared by authors, adapted from and based on Pollock 12, Pollock & Price 13,47, and Pollock et al. 46,48.
optometry services (previously free), fee hikes 
for dental services, and closing of the majority of 
existing long-term hospital beds in the NHS 11. 
Public hospitals were also encouraged to explore 
potential commercial areas such as snack bars, 
charging for use of TV sets, telephone services, 
and car parks – items that were previously free for 
NHS users. Such services, not linked directly to 
healthcare, became potential sources of financial 
gain for public institutions.
In addition to re-separation of the Depart-
ments of Health and Social Security in 1988, this 
initial phase was heavily marked by the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act of 1990. 
This reform came to be known in the literature 
as the Market Reform 12,18,19,20, since it opened 
specific sectors of the system to private organi-
zations and introduced the so-called internal 
market into the NHS, separating the acts of pur-
chasing and providing services (the purchaser/
provider split). Purchasers would receive funds 
directly from the Department of Health, and pro-
viders would compete with each other to obtain 
funds and provide services, based on commer-
cial contracts. The theoretical justification for the 
internal market’s competitive nature was that it 
would offer the necessary incentives for provid-
ers to improve their performance (efficiency and 
response to demands). Financial and manage-
ment decisions were decentralized, shifting from 
the central level in the Department of Health to 
the local level, personified by purchasers and 
providers 17,21.
The internal market was structured in stages, 
with two types of purchasers: District Health Au-
thorities (DHAs) and General Practitioners Fund-
holders (GPs were invited to manage budgets and 
were called GP Fundholders – GP-FH). The GP-FH 
budget covered the provision of primary care ser-
vices per se and the purchase of secondary care 
services for their patient lists (average of 10,000 
persons per GP group). DHAs were responsible 
for assessing the local population’s health needs 
and acquiring the totality of hospital and com-
munity services for populations linked to non-
FH GPs. For the GP-FH, the DHAs were in charge 
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of purchasing the non-commissioned part of ser-
vices (80%). Covering populations up to 200,000 
persons, DHAs had a needs-adjusted per capita 
population-based budget.
Hospitals and community health services be-
came independent providers, called trusts, with 
financing that depended on contracts with the 
DHAs 17,21,22. With the development of the inter-
nal market in this format, the DHAs were later 
replaced by the Health Authorities (HA), also in 
charge of purchasing services for patients of GPs 
who had not joined the fundholding system 21.
The reform was so sweeping that it was 
echoed in the incipient Brazilian scientific litera-
ture on the theme. Akerman 9 asked whether the 
creation of the internal market in the late Thatch-
er Era signaled the beginning of the end of the 
Welfare State or a daring management model, 
perhaps alluding to the coming new century. Fo-
menting an internal market of purchasers and 
providers was the fundamental administrative, 
theoretical, and bureaucratic change in this ini-
tial period of liberalization. Inserting the basic 
commercial act of purchasing and providing ser-
vices internally did not necessarily impact health 
services’ universal coverage. However, it did in-
troduce competition among organizations in the 
system and produced a fundamental organiza-
tional paradigm shift. This change paved the way 
for the system’s subsequent liberalization. The 
internal market allowed the later marketization 
and privatization of the NHS 18. The fundamental 
market principles proposed in the 1990 reform 
were maintained and gradually expanded, de-
spite alternating power between Conservatives 
and Labour in the following decades.
To stabilize a market relationship of purchase 
and sale of services between primary care, spe-
cialties, and hospital care and the public budget 
23, the system needed to adapt administratively 
to the new reality, entering into a new liberaliza-
tion phase.
Bureaucracy and incipient market 
(1991-2004)
The recently established internal market of the 
NHS, triggered by the separation between pur-
chasers/hirers and providers, required the sys-
tem’s administrative reorganization. A new bu-
reaucracy was shaped, focused on administering 
the internal market and the proposed new con-
tractual relationships. The entire English public 
sector drew closer to the business sector in the 
1980s 24, with organizational and financial re-
structuring. The health sector followed this trend 
in the 1990s, turning its institutions into public 
companies. The state hospital trusts began to 
present cash flow statements, balanced budgets, 
and accounting records aimed at financial return 
and, if necessary, divestiture of goods and prop-
erty to balance their books at the end of each fis-
cal year 12,25.
•	 Consolidating	the	internal	market:	
 John Major (1992-1997)
John Major, the Conservative Prime Minister that 
replaced Margaret Thatcher, took charge of con-
solidating the internal market and combatting 
state bureaucracy in the NHS.
Major’s government eliminated 14 HAs (a 
Labour legacy prior to Thatcher) and made ad-
aptations to the GP-FH model. To allow greater 
diversity in the provision of primary care, the 
possibility of salaried payment for GPs was intro-
duced 17. Several variants of GP-FH were devel-
oped, generally promoted by managers and GPs 
that had not joined the FH model: Community 
fundholders, which only purchased community 
services associated with primary healthcare; so-
called Multi-funds, or groupings of GP fundhold-
ers that shared the management of their budgets 
and respective administrative costs of their pur-
chases; Purchase Groups, in which collectives 
of GPs that did not manage budgets acted with 
the HAs to influence purchase of services in their 
geographic areas of care 22. GP-FH were imple-
mented gradually to sidestep the initial rejection 
by physicians and to keep a drastic change from 
destabilizing the NHS vis-à-vis the population. 
Adherence to the GP-FH model enjoyed an ini-
tial wave of enthusiasts, followed by a wave of 
people interested in acting as groups (Commu-
nity fundholders and Multi-funds), and finally a 
third wave consisting of a cascade effect from the 
proposed model’s growth 21. In 1996, 50% of the 
GPs had joined the fundholding model 17,21. Cost 
containment with prescriptions was the most 
immediate effect of the GP-FH, leading to gov-
ernment incentives to induce GPs that were still 
independent. The fundholding models generally 
produced gains in the extent and effectiveness of 
services, but with increasing administrative ex-
penses, transaction costs between services, and 
inequalities in access between users of different 
models (GPs in the fundholding model versus in-
dependents) 21,22.
The internal market encountered various 
structural difficulties. For purchasers, the GP-
FH model led to numerous small-scale, limit-
ed-scope purchasers whose purchasing power 
was insufficient to impact price competition in 
the local health services market 15,22. DHAs al-
so faced structural obstacles that limited their 
performance as purchasers, such as: lack of 
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demand-side integration; lack of information for 
making purchases (incipient price system, lead-
ing to market asymmetry); and local services 
monopolies 15,22.
Underfinancing of certain activities related 
to social needs and that involved long-term costs 
(e.g., care for the elderly) sparked negotiations 
over the definition of fundamental healthcare ac-
tivities as opposed to extra activities, not neces-
sarily covered by the same budget 21.
State hospitals were turned into trusts, 
semi-independent, non-profit organizations 
with a reasonable degree of freedom to set pay 
thresholds, staff composition, and types of ser-
vices offered. By 1996 there were already 350 NHS 
Trusts 21.
In short, the Conservative reform focused 
on the system’s efficiency, assuming that market 
competition would naturally increase the servic-
es’ quality and efficiency. The three basic prin-
ciples were: provider/purchaser split, stimulus 
for entry of private providers, and initiatives for 
administrative decentralization, in response to 
bureaucratic central control that was considered 
unresponsive 6. The period emphasized health 
services consumption through an approach that 
required greater responsiveness to demands and 
power to choose (Choice Initiative), and man-
agement techniques from the private sector, to 
replace the public management model 6. With 
the introduction of market mechanisms, citizens 
would be treated as consumers, amenable to 
making consumption choices 17.
The model shaped in this intermediate phase 
in which liberalization of NHS began to materi-
alize is termed quasi-market 26. Health was not 
the only public sector affected: other sectors in 
which the explicit privatization of services faced 
social rejection also became quasi-markets 
through these modernizing reforms of the state 
apparatus. In such systems, the state provides the 
financing for transactions, demand is controlled 
by purchase agents indicated by the state itself 
that act in consumers’ place, and the service is fi-
nally provided by non-profit social organizations 
or public companies that compete which each 
other to provide products 26,27.
According to Aldridge 27, in new market soci-
eties, based on support from neoliberal political 
leaders, traditional social institutions like hospi-
tals and schools introduced market mechanisms 
in their structures, treating citizens as clients or 
consumers. England is thus not an isolated case 
in this period, but part of a global phenomenon.
•	 New	Labour:	the	first	Blair	
 government (1997-2000)
This period was marked politically by the Con-
servative demise and the rise of so-called New 
Labour represented by Tony Blair. Although La-
bour had harshly criticized the Thatcher-Major 
period, it did not abandon indispensable prin-
ciples for liberalization of the NHS. Labour not 
only maintained the purchaser/provider split, 
the internal market’s mainstay, but reinforced 
corporate culture within the system.
The founding of the Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs), later grouped into Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs), consolidated the split between purchas-
ers and providers, universalizing the GP-FH 
model. By 1999, all GPs were required to join one 
of the 481 PCGs, created by the New NHS Act of 
1997. Still, the return of territorial responsibility 
centered on the population’s health, represented 
by the PCGs (PCTs, since 2000) and reinforce-
ment of the budget focus in primary care were 
responses to the GP-FH model’s failures and limi-
tations. Meanwhile, starting in 2000, the intro-
duction of trusts as a legal figure in the Primary 
Health Care as well and the creation of Foun-
dation Trusts (FTs), organizations with greater 
independence vis-à-vis central government in 
the legal, financial, and performance areas, con-
solidated the predominance of the commercial-
corporate ethos in healthcare management and 
provision 6,15,17,18,21,22.
The NHS Plan of 2000 inaugurated a period 
of steady financial support for the NHS and 
greater emphasis on primary care through trans-
formation of PCGs into PCTs 6,18. PCTs included 
all GPs in a given geographic area, covered some 
200,000 persons, and were responsible for that 
population’s healthcare with three functions: 
improve health (public health); commission/
hire and purchase health services (hospital and 
specialized); provide and develop primary care 
services and community health services (chil-
dren with disabilities, mental health). As the 
NHS administrative agency at the local level, 
PCTs were in charge of managing budgets sized 
by capitation, including pharmaceutical expen-
ditures, performing a broad role in commission-
ing specialized and hospital services; and pro-
viding community and primary care services 17. 
In 2000 there were 17 PCTs, a year later in 2001 
there were 164, and by 2003 they had increased 
to 211, when the remaining PCGs were turned 
into PCTs 18,22.
The HAs also underwent mergers, resulting in 
28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHA). Once the 
PCTs absorbed the entire extent of commission-
ing, the SHAs were in charge of strategic plan-
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ning and performance management for health 
organizations in the so-called “New NHS” 6,17,22.
Consolidation of this new structure encoun-
tered major problems. The main obstacles were 
initially organizational development, teamwork, 
and management of the consequences of abol-
ishing the GP-FH. Later, improvement of pri-
mary care provision, access to care, and the ex-
tent of professionals’ roles became the focus of 
Labour policy 22. Limited management capacity 
and budget constraints in the PCTs hindered the 
commissioning role and development of inter-
sector work 22.
The Department of Health gradually delegat-
ed the system’s administrative functions to new 
organizations established specifically for this 
purpose. These featured the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), created 
in 1999, initially responsible for health technolo-
gies assessment, regulation of the incorpora-
tion of new medicines based on cost-benefit, 
and quality of care, aimed at greater clinical 
efficiency in resource allocation 28. Its scope of 
action was gradually expanded to include the 
proposal and revision of evidence-based clinical 
care guideline, solving clinical problems posed 
by health services, and commissioning univer-
sities for research on relevant questions for the 
system. The decision-making processes, func-
tional organization, responsibilities, and politi-
cal strength of the NICE in relation to the Depart-
ment of Health are constantly questioned in the 
literature 29,30,31,32,33. Other institutions created 
in the same period and that took over functions 
previously exclusive to the Department of Health 
were: Care Quality Commission (CQC), found-
ed in 2009 to regulate the independent portion 
of the health sector through licensing, annual 
inspection, and quality improvement and per-
formance assessment of NHS and independent 
organizations; the Monitor, independent regula-
tor of FTs, and the Health Protecting Agency, re-
sponsible for defending public health interests.
The establishment of these organizations 
meant a transition to a regulatory model inde-
pendent of the Department of Health within the 
NHS 18. This period was marked by administra-
tive delegation, gradually reducing the state’s 
central responsibility in the figure of the Secre-
tary of Health, a position equivalent to the Min-
ister of Health in the Brazilian executive branch. 
The reformist rhetoric in the NHS moved from 
competition promoted by the Conservatives to 
regulation promoted by Labour 15.
A shift away from traditional population-
based public health planning occurred with the 
state’s retreat from responsibility vis-à-vis citi-
zens, a clear sign of the theoretical paradigm in 
the NHS. In keeping with the decrease in state 
responsibility for public health, there was a per-
ceptible increase in persons’ accountability for 
their own healthcare.
Due to the multiplicity of agencies and agents 
acting in the name of the Department of Health, 
Jones et al. 34 argue that beyond the quasi-mar-
ket, the NHS shifted from a hierarchical and bu-
reaucratic system to a more complex network, 
not necessarily hierarchical, with the internal 
market and previous bureaucratic hierarchy ex-
isting side by side 35,36. A form of resistance to the 
market reforms was the tacit agreement between 
some organizations to not compete with each 
other resisting the reforms that appeared mainly 
in the first decade of the 2000s 34.
•	 Second	Blair	government:	competition	
 for targets and performance (2001-2004)
Despite the administrative impact of the first 
wave of Labour reform starting in 1997, the prob-
lem of waiting lists for elective procedures and 
public concern over quality in the NHS led to a 
second wave of reforms. These increased regula-
tory control over the system, introducing perfor-
mance targets and measures and further inciting 
participation by the private sector in the supply 
of services 37, aimed at competition by these pro-
viders with the public sector. Such measures by 
Labour were considered a definitive overture by 
the NHS to market mechanisms, materialized 
in the achievement of targets and performance 
by establishments not necessarily linked to the 
Department of Health’s central administration, 
consolidating the logic of services consumption/
production in the public system 38. Belief that the 
private sector could lead the way to greater ef-
ficiency in the public sector directly influenced 
the second phase of the Labour period under 
Tony Blair. Previous Conservative objectives like 
plurality of providers, the possibility of consum-
er choice, and competition were resumed and 
implemented practically by direct private provi-
sion. This period was characterized by Labour’s 
introduction of the private ethos and status for 
NHS providers 6,15,39.
One basic policy in the second Labour phase 
was the introduction of Payment by Results 
(PbR), similar to the Diagnosis-Related Groups 
(DRGs) system in Medicare in the United States, 
a strategy that proposed that financing would 
follow the user 15,17. In practice it consisted of 
payment to providers for activities, incrementing 
the values according to results, forcing competi-
tion for better quality rather than a price com-
petition system. Implementation of this process 
resulted in prioritization of easier-to-bill proce-
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dures with the possibility of larger volume, jeop-
ardizing complex care for patients with chronic 
conditions, besides failing to guarantee quality 
improvement 40,41. Another strategy was Choice 
Initiative: supported by the discourse of expand-
ing users’ choice, it promoted provider diversifi-
cation, allowing private initiative’s entry into ser-
vices provision. The supply of a private provider 
among the alternatives became commonplace in 
cases of referrals for specialized care 17,39.
Backed by the discourse of improving qual-
ity in healthcare provision, Labour was not de-
tained by ideological or organizational barriers 
to develop and implement Private Finance Ini-
tiatives (PFI), a direct recourse to intermediation 
of private investments in the NHS Trusts 15,17. 
The PFIs, conceived in the early 1990s during 
the Conservative government, allowed consor-
tia of private companies (like construction com-
panies, general services companies, and banks) 
to raise funds (by issuing shares and taking out 
loans) in order to build and operate installations 
with public functions, like hospitals. Hospitals, 
in turn, would rent these installations (private 
property), including maintenance services and 
support teams, for 25-30-year periods. The com-
panies would profit through these consortia with 
guaranteed long-term financial, and government 
could build new hospitals without incurring im-
mediate budget outlays or increasing taxes. The 
Labour government adhered to this PFI strategy 
in its initial years, presenting a project for ex-
panding the number of hospitals belonging to 
the NHS. The policy outlined in the Delivering 
the NHS Plan of 2002 projected expansion of the 
hospital network through the PFIs, consolidat-
ing the Labour government’s pro-market tenden-
cies 12. In the broader scenario of opening health 
services to private initiative in European Union 
member countries, this process can also be seen 
as a state policy to favor British companies in the 
emerging international health market 13.
In short, Labour government retained the 
internal market created by the Conservatives, 
shifting the emphasis from competition to co-
operation with performance-centered manage-
ment. Recourse to an alternative vocabulary 
– the rhetoric of cooperation and regulation – 
allowed avoiding allegations of connections to 
throwbacks from the Thatcher era 6,39. But the 
introduction of mechanisms for institutional 
competition to promote changes reinforced the 
previous tendency to transform the state’s role 
from financer/provider to financer/regulator 5,42. 
The Conservatives’ market rationale persisted in 
reforms by Labour, steadily expanding the ac-
ceptable limits of reform from the public sector’s 
point of view. The private sector’s involvement 
increased, resulting in steady erosion of the limits 
between the two sectors in health services provi-
sion 5,42.
Pollock’s analysis dates to 2004, drawing this 
period to a close 12. The author already conclud-
ed that the NHS was drawing closer to the private 
sector as never before, a process that continued 
in the subsequent phase, analyzed next.
Market opening, fragmentation, and 
discontinuity of services (2005-2012)
The third stage in the liberalization of the NHS 
was the system’s actual opening to the market, 
peaking in the Health and Social Care Act of 2012. 
Previously the Practice Based Commissioning 
(PBC) policy beginning in 2005 had reintroduced 
the possibility of GP groups managing budgets 
to purchase services and implement standard-
ized care plans. PBC also included peer review of 
GP referrals, contradictorily restricting the free-
dom of individual characteristics in these same 
healthcare plans. PBC meant internal decen-
tralization of the PCTs, simultaneously turning 
the previously cooperative ties between primary 
and secondary care into competitive relations 
6,43, serving as an administrative embryo for 
implementation of the Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) in the 2012 reform.
The actual opening of the health system to 
the market was the extinction of the basic ter-
ritorial health models (PCTs) in favor of the CCGs 
and the possibility of private entities selling ser-
vices in the name of the NHS, changes allowed by 
the Health and Social Care Act of 2012, the apogee 
of the public health service liberalization initi-
ated by Thatcher in 1979. While the intermedi-
ate phase of liberalization concentrated on the 
system’s commercial and administrative bureau-
cratization, the interstices between this phase 
and the new legislation of 2012 was marked by 
the gradual shifting of so-called soft services to 
legally private entities: administration of routine 
data produced by the system (Health and Social 
Care Information Centre), pathology and radiol-
ogy services, administrative services, and com-
missioning of scientific research 44,45.
The Health and Social Care Act of 2012 po-
tentially modifies government obligations and 
was considered a waiver by the English govern-
ment, represented by the Minister of Health, in 
taking mandatory responsibility for providing 
comprehensive/integral health services, putting 
an end to so-called duty of care (the equivalent 
of the right to health as a duty of the state, pro-
vided in the Brazilian Constitution). Although 
this waiver has not materialized immediately 
as changes in health services’ routine practice, 
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other provisions of the new law effectively open 
the way for private entities (such as support ser-
vices for CCGs in the purchase of specialized 
and hospital health services) to determine the 
scope of procedures to be purchased, control-
ling the supply. Simultaneously with this weak-
ening of guaranteed access to services and their 
scope, another fundamental change is the aban-
donment of the geographic criterion as the basis 
for allocating resources and structuring services. 
The CCGs become responsible only for the pa-
tients registered in their client lists rather than 
for all the residents in a given territory, except 
for emergency services. This means not only 
that a CCG does not have to purchase health 
services for a given region’s population, but that 
it can count on patients from other regions in 
its registered patients list, whatever the geo-
graphic distance. A similar process (with sepa-
rate legislation) applies to primary care, with 
the suspension of geographic limits as a factor 
limiting GP choice. The result of this change in 
practice is that both GPs and CCGs can com-
pete throughout England for patients/clients for 
their respective services. Under this new format, 
resource allocation becomes highly complex, 
and population-based allocative mechanisms 
are no longer useful due to elimination of the 
geographic criterion. Under the new structure, 
budgets based on the size of the “client portfo-
lios” are similar to the sickness fund models of 
Continental Europe and private health insur-
ance in general. Such models commonly lead 
to risk selection, co-payments, and the need to 
acquire complementary insurance 46.
Under the NHS legislation passed in 2012, 
the purchasers of services, CCGs, manage the 
budgets and are subordinated to NHS England 
(initially called the NHS Commissioning Board), 
the organization that regulates and oversees the 
CCGs. All GPs must join a CCG, and the services 
to be purchased are provided by the Foundation 
Trusts (administrators of the former public hos-
pitals), as well as by “any qualified provider” of 
health services. On the providers’ side, the regu-
latory and supervisory entities are the Monitor 
and the Quality Care Commission, the mission 
of which is to maximize the respective providers’ 
autonomy, while stimulating competition. Pol-
lock et al. 46 highlight that the regulatory enti-
ties have limited sanctioning power and that the 
relations between purchasers and providers be-
come commercial contracts and no longer agree-
ments with the public sphere of the NHS 46. Such 
changes have serious implications, since they 
expose the NHS to legal precedents to guarantee 
competition in international economic and trade 
agreements 46.
Extensive administrative decentralization 
in the new NHS following the 2012 reform, plus 
waiver of the previous territorial budget plan-
ning logic, poses a risk to equity in the English 
health system. First, the CCGs have limited ca-
pacity to exercise commissioning activity with a 
view towards equity. Maintenance of equity in a 
universalist health system like the NHS requires 
the production and analysis of population data, 
which the CCGs have neither the conditions to 
generate nor the responsibility to analyze. The 
professionals qualified for the task are the pub-
lic health experts. Following decentralization of 
public health activities, they work in the local/
municipal governments, not in the CCGs. Be-
sides, local governments’ administrative juris-
diction does not coincide with that of the CCGs. 
In addition, a system with multiple independent 
purchasers, with little capacity to influence pro-
viders’ behavior, poses risks to health services’ 
supply/demand balance 4.
The main characteristic of this third phase of 
liberalization is the legal crystallization of the shift 
from a risk-sharing culture to the institutional 
organization of payment for the act of assuming 
the risk, similar to the logic of private health in-
surance in the United States 46. The main source 
of financing is still public, but providers are not 
necessarily public entities as before. As long as 
they are properly registered and meet the legal 
requirements, any private entity can compete to 
supply health services in the liberalized NHS 13. 
For the first time in the system’s history, Founda-
tion Trusts Hospitals can generate up to 49% of 
the revenue from provision of services to private 
patients, previously limited by law. Another prec-
edent is the possibility of discontinuing services 
that are not in the provider’s interest, directly af-
fecting the system’s universality.
In the European Union, the local and inter-
national context is marked by the controversial 
immigration issue. Warfare in the Middle East 
sparked the resurgence of xenophobic social 
movements, threatening “illegal” and socially 
disadvantaged European immigrants, especially 
from Eastern European countries, straining uni-
versal entitlement in Central European countries. 
The “Brexit” issue (whether the United Kingdom 
will exit or remain in the European Union), ex-
pressed in the national referendum in 2016, re-
lates to these processes. Meanwhile, the global 
financial crisis has resulted directly in the fiscal 
austerity proposed by the EU, such that member 
countries decrease the public revenue in social 
sectors, jeopardizing access to health again.
BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH UNDER THE INFLUENCE NEOLIBERALISM 11
Cad. Saúde Pública, Rio de Janeiro, 32(8):e00034716, ago, 2016
Final remarks
The establishment of the internal market, trans-
formation of the relationship between financers 
and providers, corporate management, and lib-
eralization of the NHS for private providers are 
part of a global historical, economic, and politi-
cal context that affects universal entitlement.
The article addressed the effects of economic 
liberalism on the right to health in the NHS. Al-
though technically complex, the reforms reflect 
the contemporary influence of market theories 
and economic globalization, with a turnaround 
in social services in the last two decades of the 
20th century. The article emphasizes the reduc-
tion in the state’s role as provider and an increase 
in its regulatory action. There has been an insti-
tutional retreat from humanist risk-sharing theo-
ries and solidarity that formed the basis for the 
creation of the British NHS following World War 
II. In the process, corresponding concepts and 
practices such as competition between provid-
ers, services commissioning, and responsibility 
for user lists rather than by geographic area (de-
territorialization) are included in the system as 
part of public health policy.
The health market in England, previously 
incipient, tends to expand, making the pub-
lic system hybrid as relates to the mix of state 
establishments and private services, gradually 
channeling public resources to private entities. 
State responsibility for the population’s health 
is thereby restricted. As part of the new bureau-
cracy needed for a system closer to the market, 
fundamental changes are occurring in the col-
lection and processing of epidemiological data 
routinely produced by the system 44,45, affect-
ing the planning, evaluation, and production 
of fundamental health indicators for individual 
and collective curative and preventive actions. 
Such changes jeopardize classical public health 
action based on epidemiological, demographic, 
and territorial criteria.
The analysis of the liberalization of NHS in 
phases, initially proposed by Pollock 12 and Pol-
lock & Price 47 and explored in this article, facili-
tates the understanding of a complex political 
and administrative process, focused in the ulti-
mate analysis on the change in the public ethos 
of the NHS. A health system that originated as 
part of a redistributive social policy, guarantee-
ing universal entitlement, has gradually become 
part of a mechanism for exploiting services, ori-
ented towards extracting profit in a commercial 
relationship with the use of health services. As in 
any commercial relationship, situations that tend 
not to favor dividends are rejected by financers, 
leading to financial unfeasibility and closing of 
services, already observed in the first years fol-
lowing the 2012 reform 48.
The principal and most serious consequence 
of the gradual but steady liberalization of the 
NHS as a whole is the restriction of universal en-
titlement. This restriction materializes in barriers 
to access to health and discretionary reduction 
of coverage by CCGs in services supply and com-
missioning. The reforms also involve stratifica-
tion of the population clientele by risk selection, 
abandonment of the territorialized planning and 
healthcare model, and separation of individual 
care from collective actions. Expanded control of 
access to secondary services leads to closing of 
unprofitable services, undermining the compre-
hensiveness of care 49. Cutbacks and closing of 
services have occurred since 2013, and some cas-
es are still pending in the UK Supreme Court 48.
Liberalization of the English NHS is still under 
way. The NHS is one of the developed countries’ 
most efficient and effective systems. Countries 
that spend more on health, like the United States, 
still display worse health indicators, despite their 
high budget. Support for the NHS as a public sys-
tem remains high in the English population, who 
consider it a “national treasure”, a symbol of so-
cial pride displayed in the opening ceremony of 
the London Olympic Games in 2012.
The British system is an international histori-
cal reference for health entitlement, prioritizing 
universality, and organizing a system with pri-
mary care as the portal of entry with case-reso-
lution capacity, acting in cooperation with other 
sectors of care to ensure comprehensive health-
care. Such administrative reforms, part of an ad-
verse political and economic context, interpose 
market logic in clinical and epidemiological rea-
soning in management decisions, thereby jeop-
ardizing the reason for being of the public health 
system itself: the population’s universal right to 
care and prevention.
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Resumo
A recente reforma do Serviço Nacional de Saúde (NHS) 
inglês por meio do Health and Social Care Act de 2012 
introduziu mudanças importantes na organização, 
gestão e prestação de serviços públicos de saúde na 
Inglaterra. O objetivo deste estudo é analisar as refor-
mas do NHS no contexto histórico de predomínio de 
teorias neoliberais desde 1980 e discutir o processo de 
“liberalização” do NHS. São identificados e analisados 
três momentos: (i) gradativa substituição ideológica e 
teórica (1979-1990) – transição da lógica profissional e 
sanitária para uma lógica gerencial/comercial; (ii) bu-
rocracia e mercado incipiente (1991-2004) – estrutu-
ração de burocracia voltada à administração do mer-
cado interno e expansão de medidas pró-mercado; e 
(iii) abertura ao mercado, fragmentação e descontinu-
idade de serviços (2005-2012) – fragilização do mod-
elo de saúde territorial e consolidação da saúde como 
um mercado aberto a prestadores públicos e privados. 
Esse processo gradual e constante de liberalização vem 
levando ao fechamento de serviços e à restrição do 
acesso, comprometendo a integralidade, a equidade e 
o direito universal à saúde no NHS.
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Resumen
La reciente reforma del Servicio Nacional de Salud 
(NHS) inglés a través de la Health and Social Care Act 
de 2012 introdujo cambios importantes en la organi-
zación, gestión y prestación de los servicios de salud 
pública en Inglaterra. El objetivo de este estudio es 
analizar las reformas del NHS en el contexto histórico 
del predominio de las teorías neoliberales desde 1980 
y discutir el proceso de “liberalización” del NHS. Fue-
ron identificados y se analizaron tres momentos: (i) 
sustitución gradual ideológica y teórica (1979-1990) 
-transición de la lógica profesional y de salud para 
una lógica de gestión/negocio; (ii) la burocracia y el 
mercado incipiente (1991-2004) -estructuración de la 
burocracia dedicada a la gestión del mercado interior 
y la expansión de las medidas pro-mercado; y (iii) la 
apertura del mercado, la fragmentación y la disconti-
nuidad de los servicios (2005-2012) -fragilización del 
modelo de salud territorial y consolidación de la salud 
como un mercado abierto para los proveedores públi-
cos y privados. Este proceso gradual y constante de la 
liberalización ha provocado el cierre de los servicios y 
la restricción del acceso, comprometiendo la integri-
dad, justicia y derecho universal a la salud en el NHS. 
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